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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, z 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960609-CA 
v. : 
JOHN KYLE LEGG, JR. : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and sentence entered upon a 
plea of guilty to failure to respond to an officer's signal to 
stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6-13.5 (Supp. 1996) (a copy of the statute is attached in 
addendum A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the prosecutor's recommendation at sentencing 
that defendant be incarcerated constituted a breach of the plea 
agreement under which the State agreed not to oppose in-patient 
treatment if such a program would accept defendant? Because the 
State concedes this issue, no standard of review is applicable. 
2. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to 
recuse the judge prior to sentencing following disclosure of a 
discussion between court staff and the prosecutor at the change 
of plea hearing? This court reviews a trial judge's refusal to 
recuse himself for an abuse of discretion, a violation of Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, the existence of actual bias, or 
the appearance of bias coupled with actual prejudice. State v. 
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 
1090 (1990); State v. Neeley. 748 P.2d 1091, 1094-95 (Utah), 
cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1220 (1988); Stfrte v. AlOHZQ, 932 P.2d 
606, 610-11 (Utah App. 1997). Actual prejudice occurs where there 
is a w*reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant.'" Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 611 (quoting Gardner, 789 P.2d 
at 278) . 
Based on the State's concession of error on Issue #1, this 
Court need not reach defendant's remaining claims of error. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND PULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, John Kyle Legg, Jr., was originally charged with 
receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1993); 
failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 1996); 
and criminal mischief, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (Supp. 1996) (R. 7-8). Thereafter, the 
State and defendant entered into a plea bargain pursuant to which 
defendant pled guilty to failure to respond to an officer's 
signal, the remaining two charges were dismissed, and the State 
agreed "not [to] appose [sic] a inpatient [sic] program if one 
can be obtained" (R. 29, 56, 90) (copies of the transcript of the 
change of plea hearing and of the Statement of Defendant 
regarding his plea are attached as addenda B and C respectively). 
Thirty-two days later, defendant, through his first counsel, 
filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that, based 
on a conversation involving court staff and overheard in court 
just prior to defendant's entry of his guilty plea, there was a 
conspiracy to "mislead" him into entering a guilty plea and the 
trial court harbored bias against him (R. 37-38). Defendant's 
original trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw from the case 
3 
two days later, claiming that defendant's assertion of defense 
counsel's involvement in the conspiracy warranted his withdraw 
(R. 37-38, 109-10). The latter motion was granted, and 
defendant's current counsel was appointed (R. 42). At 
defendant's request, a hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea 
was continued (R. Ill), and the trial court advised defendant's 
current counsel that he had two days to supplement the record 
with evidence to support his conspiracy claim (R. 112-13). 
Defendant, through counsel, thereafter filed a motion and 
affidavit seeking to have the trial judge disqualified from the 
case (R. 61-65) (attached in addendum D). The affidavit outlined 
defendant's version of the conversation and stated that the 
conversation, together with the court's knowledge of it, "allows 
the fair inference and mitigates the Defendant's belief that the 
Court is biased and/or prejudiced against him" (R. 64-65) . 
Addendum D. Defendant also requested and was permitted to 
withdraw his earlier motion to withdraw his plea (R. 66). The 
motion to disqualify the judge was ultimately denied based on the 
insufficiency of the supporting affidavit (R. 70-71, 74-76) 
(copies of the relevant minute entries and order are attached in 
addendum E), and, following preparation of a pre-sentence 
investigation report, the trial court sentenced defendant to the 
4 
Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years, and 
ordered him to pay restitution (R. 72). 
Defendant timely appealed, seeking a remand directing that 
the trial judge be disqualified from the case and that defendant 
be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant's Br. at 34. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because of the entry of a guilty plea below, and the absence 
of the preliminary hearing transcript on appeal, the true facts 
underlying the original charges are not fully apparent on the 
record. The probable cause statement in the information provides 
as follows: 
Defendant has been identified by Deputy Miller to be 
the person who[, on October 22, 1995,] was driving a car 
belonging to John Pizzello. Pizzello had reported the car 
stolen on October 19, 1995. Defendant sped off when he saw 
Deputy Miller. [M]iller activated his lights and siren and 
followed Defendant who attempted to flee from him. 
Defendant turned his car and drove into Miller's County 
Police car [sic], causing damage over $5,000.00. 
(R. 8-9). 
Defendant's statement in support of his plea provides: 
The defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that failed 
to stop after receiving a visual or audible signal to stop. 
After the car stopped the defendant fled on foot. 
(R. 30). Addendum C. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: The State concedes that the prosecutor 
inadvertently breached the plea agreement by recommending 
incarceration at the sentencing hearing. The State further 
agrees that where the issue is raised for the first time on 
appeal pursuant to both the plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel doctrines, defendant is entitled to a 
remand to allow him to withdraw his plea under the case law of 
this jurisdiction. 
Point II: Defendant fails to establish any error in the 
trial judge's failure to recuse himself. Defendant presents no 
colorable claim of bias or reasonable question as to the trial 
judge's impartiality where the record does not establish that the 
court staff member allegedly involved in the subject conversation 
made any representation against defendant. Further, defendant's 
claim of an abuse of discretion is without support, and he 
establishes no appearance of bias on the part of the court. Even 
assuming bias, defendant fails to establish actual prejudice, 
where defendant merely speculates as to the trial judge's 
motivation in handling defendant and fails to demonstrate that 
there is any reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for 
defendant absent denial of his recusal motion. Finally, 
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defendant failed to include in the appellate record a copy of the 
presentence investigation report upon which the trial court 
heavily relied in sentencing defendant. Absent that report, this 
Court cannot determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable sentence for defendant. 
ARGUMENTS 
Although defendant presents a number of different claims of 
error, this Court need address only two: (1) the prosecutor's 
breach of the plea agreement, which is conceded by the State; and 
(2)the recusal of the sentencing judge. See State v. Maguire. 
924 P.2d 904, 905 (Utah App. 1996), cert, granted. 931 P.2d 146 
(Utah 1997). 
POINT I 
GIVEN THE POSTURE OF THIS CASE, DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED 
TO A REMAND TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA BASED ON THE 
PROSECUTOR'S INADVERTENT BREACH OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
AS REPRESENTED IN DEFENDANT'S BITTEN STATEMENT, 
THEREBY RETURNING THE PARTIES TO THEIR PRE-PLEA 
POSITIONS 
Defendant's first point on appeal concerns the prosecutor's 
breach of the plea agreement. According to the written statement 
of defendant in support of his guilty plea, the prosecutor agreed 
that the "state will not apose [sic] a inpatient [sic] program if 
one can be obtained" (R. 29; see also R. 56, Affidavit of Lynn R. 
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Brown, "the state at sentencing would not oppose an in-patient 
treatment program placement for Mr. Legg if a program would 
accept him.") (a copy of Mr. Brown's affidavit is attached in 
addendum F). Addendum B. The prosecutor signed the written 
statement (R. 35). Addendum B. At sentencing, defense counsel 
made the following representation, without any elaboration: 
There are two programs out there who are prepared 
to accept [defendant]. One is the Salvation Army and 
the other one is something called IRC. 
(R. 119) (a copy of the sentencing transcript is attached in 
addendum G). A different prosecutor who was present at the 
sentencing hearing thereafter made the following recommendation1: 
. . . At this point we have to ask you to safeguard 
the community, follow the recommendations of the presentence 
report an[d] return [defendant] to the Utah State Prison. 
(R. 121). Addendum G. Defense counsel made no objection to the 
prosecutor's recommendation, challenging it for the first time on 
appeal under the doctrines of plain error and ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. Appellant's Br. at 17-21. 
•^Different prosecutors were involved at different stages of 
the proceedings (R. 58, 89, 106, 115). The prosecutor assigned 
to the case did not make the plea bargain, and neither of those 
prosecutors was present at sentencing (R. 58, 115). The State 
recognizes that, while this explains how the error occurred, it 
does not excuse it. See Santobello v. New Yorkr 404 U.S. 257, 
262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499 (1971). 
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Based on the record before it, the State concedes that the 
prosecutor's recommendation at sentencing went beyond the plea 
agreement as set forth in the statement of defendant. Given the 
arguments presented on appeal, defendant is entitled to a remand 
to allow him to withdraw his plea. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 
1266, 1275-76 (Utah 1988) (reviewing the cases of Santobello v. 
New York. 404 U.S. 257 (1971), State v. Kay. 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 
1986), and State v. Garfield. 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976), and 
finding that Utah law requires that a "defendant must be allowed 
to withdraw his plea if the State made a promise it did not or 
could not fulfill [,]" regardless of whether the promise would 
have influenced the trial judge); ass, e.g.. State v. Irwin. 924 
P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996) (refusing to reach same issue when 
the situation did not invoke the exceptional circumstances 
concept and appellant failed to establish plain error and failed 
to raise ineffective assistance of counsel), cert, denied. 931 
P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). Upon withdrawal of the plea, the parties 
will be returned to their pre-plea positions, and defendant will 
be subject to prosecution and sentencing for all the charges 
originally filed against him. See State v. Gentry. 797 P.2d 456, 
459 n.4 (Utah App. 1990), cert, granted. No. 900442 (Utah Jan. 
9 
30, 1991)2; State v. Valencia. 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah App. 
1989); see also Utah Code Ann- § 76-3-405 (Supp. 1997). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AN 
APPEARANCE OF BIAS, OR ACTUAL PREJUDICE; ACCORDINGLY, 
ANY ERROR IN THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FAILURE TO RECUSE 
HIMSELF DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL 
Defendant argues that the sentencing judge committed 
reversible error by denying defendant's motion to recuse the 
judge after he was informed about a discussion between the 
prosecutor and one of the court's staff which included a comment 
about the defendant. Just before the change of plea hearing on 
December 28, 1995, a witness subpoenaed by defendant was waiting 
in the courtroom when she overheard a conversation between one of 
the court's staff and the prosecutor concerning "allegations of 
the defendant's misconduct in court on a prior case" (R. 57, 58-
59, 109-10). Defendant contends that his first counsel below was 
present in the courtroom at the time; counsel and the prosecutor 
claim he was not (R. 58-59, 110). Defendant argues that the 
involvement of the court's personnel warrants recusal of the 
sentencing judge because it leaves the court's impartiality 
2According to a clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, the 
petition for certiorari was dismissed on March 7, 1991, due to 
the death of the defendant. 
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"reasonably open to question" and suggests that defendant was 
prejudiced by his treatment below. Appellant's Br. at 32-33. 
Prior to sentencing, defendant, represented by current 
counsel, filed a motion seeking to disqualify the sentencing 
judge from further participation in the case {R. 61-62). 
Addendum D. The motion was supported by counsel's affidavit 
which: outlined the offensive conduct as: it had been explained to 
him by the subpoenaed witness and defendant; noted that at a 
hearing subsequent to the conversation the court had stated for 
the record its understanding of the exchange as explained to it 
by defendant's former counsel; and summarily claimed that the 
court's knowledge wallows the fair inference and mitigates the 
Defendant's belief that the Court is biased and/or prejudiced 
against him" (R. 63-65) . Addendum D. 
The trial court thereafter made a minute entry, explaining 
that he was referring the matter to the Presiding Judge Leslie A. 
Lewis because the court "questions the sufficiency of the 
affidavit" (R. 66, 70). Addendum E. Judge Lewis independently 
reviewed the matter, found the affidavit to be legally 
insufficient, and denied the motion (R. 74-75). Addendum E. 
Defendant has the burden of establishing reversible error 
when appealing the denial of a motion to recuse a trial judge, 
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and the standard for establishing his claim is found in State v. 
Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1997). In Alonzo. this Court 
recognized that there are two alternative avenues available to 
defendant in this situation. First, defendant must show non-
compliance with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, actual bias, 
or an abuse of discretion. State v. Neeley. 748 P.2d 1091 
(Utah), cert, denied. 487 U.S. 1220 (1988). Of these, defendant 
alleges only an abuse of discretion. Appellant's Br. at 32-34.3 
Alternatively, defendant may establish the existence of an 
appearance of bias together with actual prejudice. See State v. 
gflrfer, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 
1090 (1990); AIQUZG, 932 P.2d at 611. 
As a threshold matter, defendant has failed to meet his 
burden because he has not provided a colorable claim of bias or 
established a reasonable question as to the trial judge's 
impartiality. Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094-95; Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 
610. Defendant's claim rests on his assertion that the court's 
staff member made an inappropriate comment to the prosecutor. 
Appellant's Br. at 32-34. However, the only support he has for 
*That the trial judge complied with rule 29 is clear in the 
record, with both the trial judge and the presiding judge finding 
that the documents were legally insufficient to warrant recusal 
(R. 70-71, 74-76). 
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that point is the affidavit of defendant's current counsel 
submitted in support of his recusal motion below (R. 64). On the 
other hand, the State's written response to defendant's motion 
suggests that it was the prosecutor who stated his "personal 
opinions of the defendant" and who did not necessarily "speak 
kindly of him" (R. 59). Neither the trial judge nor defendant's 
former counsel attributed the comment to anyone in particular (R. 
56-57, 109-10). If the comment is not attributable to the court 
or its staff, then defendant's claims of appearance of bias and 
abuse of discretion on the part of the court are without merit: a 
prosecutor's expression of his personal opinion of defendant, no 
matter how inopportune, cannot reasonably operate to clothe the 
trial court with bias against defendant. Because defendant fails 
to provide a colorable claim of bias, this Court should affirm 
the trial court's denial of defendant's recusal motion. Neeley. 
748 P.2d at 1094-95; Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 610. 
Similarly, under the Neeley standard, defendant's abuse of 
discretion claim should be rejected. Defendant cites to the Code 
of Judicial Conduct to establish the trial judge's responsibility 
to make every reasonable effort to ensure that his staff refrains 
from behaving in any manner which may be perceived as 
prejudicial. Appellant's Br. at 33. He then summarily claims 
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that the court's failure to "easily" remedy the situation by 
recusing himself constitutes an abuse of discretion warranting 
reversal. Id. at 33-34. However, on this record, it is unclear 
that the Code of Judicial Conduct was ever violated inasmuch as 
the subject comment is not necessarily attributable to the court. 
Even assuming there was an appearance of impropriety, it is clear 
in this jurisdiction that, while a trial judge should strive to 
comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct, his failure to live up 
to the standards therein does not, alone, entitle defendant to a 
remand. Neeley. 748 P.2d at 1094-95; Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 610. 
Moreover, there is no support for defendant's claim that the mere 
fact that recusal might be an "easy" remedy for any appearance of 
impropriety, without more, establishes an abuse of discretion. 
Appellant's Br. at 34. 
Defendant also claims that the appearance of bias arising 
from the participation of the court's staff in the conversation, 
coupled with actual prejudice suffered from the trial judge's 
failure to recuse himself, warrants reversal. Id. He 
speculatively argues that "it appears" he was prejudiced by the 
partiality demonstrated when the court accepted a guilty plea 
absent a legal or factual basis and failed to address the 
prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement. Id. 
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As noted above, the record does not support defendant's 
assertion of an appearance of bias. However, even assuming an 
appearance of bias, defendant fails to establish actual prejudice 
to warrant a remand. To establish prejudice, defendant must show 
that, had the judge recused himself, "xthere was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.'" 
Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 611 (quoting Gardner, 789 P.2d at 278) 
(additional citations omitted). 
Defendant claims that he suffered prejudice in the taking of 
the plea and in the rendering of the sentence. First, he claims 
that the judge appeared to demonstrate prejudice by accepting and 
entering a guilty plea without any legal or factual basis. 
Appellant's Br. at 34. However, even if the judge had recused 
himself upon defendant's request, the plea would still have been 
taken because the recusal motion was not filed until forty-six 
days after entry of the plea (R. 26-27, 61-62). A recusal at 
that point would not have affected the prior entry of the plea, 
so defendant has not established actual prejudice. 
Defendant also claims that the trial court's failure to 
catch the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement further 
demonstrates actual prejudice suffered because the judge refused 
to recuse himself. Appellant's Br. at 34. However, as defendant 
15 
points out, his own counsel also failed to notice the breach 
below. Without more, the failure to recognize the breach of the 
plea agreement does not establish that the court harbored 
prejudice toward defendant any more than it establishes that 
defense counsel harbored the same prejudice against defendant. 
Such a speculative claim fails to establish the "actual 
prejudice" required for reversal. Alonzo. 932 P.2d at 611. 
Finally, even if this Court were to conclude that the trial 
judge should have recused himself due to an appearance of bias, 
defendant has failed to establish that his substantial rights 
were affected because he has not provided an adequate record on 
which this Court could determine whether there would be a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant had his recusal motion been granted. Alonzo. 932 P.2d 
at 611. The sentence imposed on defendant stemmed directly from 
defendant's "prior record, his inability to complete probation 
successfully, and the underlying facts in this particular case", 
which "clearly call out to protect the community" (R. 124-25) . 
Addendum G. The sentencing judge began his explanation for the 
sentence he was imposing by noting that he had reviewed the "full 
contents of the Presentence Report" and was going to follow the 
recommendation contained therein (R. 122). Addendum G. The 
16 
Court then identified the "major problem" facing defendant as 
"his demonstrated prior conviction record, and the underlying 
facts in this particular case" (R. 122). Addendum G. The court 
went on to read from the presentence report, identifying the 
content of the report as demonstrating a serious anger management 
problem, and noting that the report and the facts underlying this 
case show defendant to be a person who not only "is just out of 
control and who continually violates the law[,]" but who poses "a 
fairly serious threat to the community" (R. 123-24). Addendum G. 
Despite the clear basis stated by the court for its 
sentencing decision--which does not appear to rely in any way on 
the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation--defendant has failed 
to include as part of the record on appeal, the presentence 
report which factored so heavily in the sentencing court's 
decision. Absent that report, this Court is unable to determine 
whether there was any reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
sentence for defendant had the judge recused himself below. 
Accordingly, this Court should assume the propriety of the lower 
court's sentencing determination and reject defendant's summary, 
speculative, and unfounded claim of prejudice. See State v. 
Christofferson. 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah App. 1990) ("When raising 
objections on appeal, appellant has the burden to see that the 
17 
record contains the materials necessary to support his appeal."). 
££^ Ona Int'l. Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 461 (Utah 
1993) (refusing to address an issue for which "defendants failed 
to supply a sufficient record" for the court's review). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
P. Q?^day RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this CY ' day of July, 1997 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARl' 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
41-6-13 MOTOR VEHICLES 118 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- tions accordingly; in Subsection (20) inserted *A 
ment, effective April 29, 1996, added Subsec- moped includes..." at the end; and in Subsection 
tion (10) redesignating the subsequent subsec- (23) added "moped, electric assisted bicycle." 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXJL — Modern status of sudden emer-
gency doctrine, 10 A.L.R.5th 680. 
ARTICLE 2 
EFFECT OF AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC 
REGULATIONS 
41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other traffic con-
trollers. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXJL — Criminal liability for false person-
ation during stop for traffic infraction, 26 
A.L.R.5th 378. 
41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop — 
Fleeing —• Causing property damage or bodily 
injury — Suspension of driver's license — Forfei-
ture of vehicle — Penalties. 
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a peace 
officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton 
disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any 
vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or 
other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree. The court shall, as part of 
any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not less than $1,000. 
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes death 
or serious bodily injury to another person, under circumstances not amounting 
to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second degree. The 
court shall, as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not 
less than $5,000. 
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other 
section, an operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from 
a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful 
or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the 
operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace 
officer by vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's license revoked 
pursuant to Subsection 53-3-220(1 XaXix) for a period of one year. 
(b) The court shall collect the driver's license to be revoked and forward 
it to the Division of Drivers' License Services, along with a report of the 
conviction. If the court is unable to collect the driver's license, the court 
shall nevertheless forward the report to the division. If the person is the 
holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not 
collect the driver's license but shall notify the division and the division 
shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing state. 
119 TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-13 .7 
History: C. 19S3, 41-6-13.5, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
1978, ch. 33,5 38; L. 1981, ch. 269,ft 1; 1987, ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Sub-
ch. 138, 9 6; 1993, ch. 71, * 1; 1995, ch. 20, section 53-3-220UXaXix)" for "Section 41-2-
127(lXhr near the end of Subsection (3Xa). ft 89 
ANALYSIS 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Jurisdiction. Included offenses. 
Included offenses.
 I n p r 0 8 e c u t i o n f o r eluding a police officer, 
Jur isdic t ion. defendant was not entitled to jury instruction 
While the lands on which plaintiff was on lesser included offense of disobeying police 
stopped for speeding are clearly within the officer because jury had no rational basis to 
original boundaries of the Indian Reservation, conclude that defendant did willfully disregard 
they are included in the geographic area that the officers' signal to stop his car, immediately 
the United State Supreme Court determined to increase his speed in response to the officers' 
no longer be Indian country, and the courts of signal, and fail to pull over for several miles, 
this state properly exercised criminal jurisdic- but was at no time attempting to flee or elude 
tion over her for failure to respond to an offi- the officers. State v. Simpson, 274 Utah Adv. 
car's signal to stop. State v. Kozlowicz, 284 Rep. 44 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
41-6-13.7. Vehicle subject to forfeiture — Seizure — Pro-
cedure. 
(1) Any conveyance, including vehicles, aircraft, water craft, or other vessel 
used in violation of Section 41-6-13.5 shall be subject to forfeiture and no 
property right exists in it, except that: 
(a) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the 
transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited under 
this section unless it appears that the owner or other person in charge of 
the conveyance was a consenting party or privy to violation of this chapter; 
(b) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason of 
any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge 
or consent; and 
(c) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a bona fide security interest 
is subject to the interest of a secured party who could not have known in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did take place 
in the use of the conveyance. 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this section may be seized by any 
peace officer of this state upon notice and service of process issued by any court 
having jurisdiction over the property. However, seizure without notice and 
service of process may be made when: 
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest to search under a search warrant 
or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant; 
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior 
judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture 
proceeding under this section; or 
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has 
been used in violation of the provisions of Section 41-6-13.5. 
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), proceedings under Subsec-
tion (6) shall be instituted without unreasonable delay. 
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is in 
custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the 
orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. When 
property is seized under this section, the appropriate person or agency may: 
ADDENDUM B 
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1 Thursday, December 28, 1995 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: This is case No. 951901968, State of 
4 Utah vs. Legg. Counsel, would you identify yourselves for 
5 the record please. 
6 MR. BROWN: Lynn Brown appearing on behalf of Mr. 
7 Legg. 
8 MR. SPIKES: John Spikes for the State, Your 
9 Honor, standing in for Roger Blaylock. 
10 THE COURT: The court has been informed that 
11 there has been a resolution reached in this particular 
12 case. Mr. Brown, would you state for the record what you 
13 believe the disposition to be? 
14 MR. BROWN: It is proposed that count 1 and count 
15 3, the stolen motor vehicle and the criminal mischief, 
16 will be dismissed and there will be a guilty plea to count 
17 2, fleeing from a police officer. 
18 MR. SPIKES: That is correct, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: And I should ask you as well, 
20 Mr. Spikes, and I recognize this is not your case, have 
21 any of the alleged victims been informed of this proposed 
22 disposition and if so, do you know what their position is? 
23 MR. SPIKES: They have, Your Honor. We have 
24 discussed it with the victims. Both the owner of the 
25 alleged stolen car, as well as the deputy sheriff that was 
2 
1 involved in the chase. They are comfortable with this 
2 resolution. There are insurance companies involved and we 
3 are leaving the issues of restitution to the insurance 
4 companies. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Legg, is it your desire, sir, to 
6 resolve this case by accepting the proposed disposition 
7 and enter a guilty plea to count 2 of the information, the 
8 charge of failure to respond to an officer's signal to 
9 stop, a third degree felony? 
10 A. (By Mr. Legg) Yes, I am. 
11 Q. (By the Court) At this time, Mr. Legg, is 
12 anyone forcing you or promising you with anything to get 
13 you to plead guilty to count 2? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Are you under the influence of any alcohol, 
16 drugs or medication or anything else that might interfere 
17 with your ability to think clearly and understand what you 
18 are doing here today by pleading guilty to count 2? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Additionally, Mr. Legg, count 2 of the 
21 information that you are pleading guilty to, being a third 
22 degree felony, carries a potential penalty of zero to 5 
23 years at the Utah State Prison, a fine up to $5,000, plus 
24 an 85 percent surcharge assessment. As well as you could 
25 be ordered to pay for any restitution or damages that may 
0 ft o n y i 
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1 have resulted from this incident as well. Do you 
2 understand that those are the potential penalties? 
3 A. Yes, I am. 
4 Q. You should also understand, Mr. Legg, that it 
5 is very likely that Mr. Brown, as well as the State of 
6 Utah, are going to make recommendations as to how you 
7 should be sentenced. I think it is important for you to 
8 understand before you do plead guilty, that I am not 
9 obligated to follow any of their sentencing 
10 recommendations. Do you understand that? 
11 A. Yes, I do. 
12 Q. Now there is also the possibility, Mr. Legg, 
13 and I don't know if you fall into this category or not, 
14 quite frankly, but if you are currently on probation or 
15 parole, for example, your guilty plea here today to this 
16 charge may in fact be a violation of any probation or 
17 parole that you might be on. 
18 Additionally, there is the potential that if you 
19 are on probation or parole that if a commitment is imposed 
20 on this particular case, that the commitment in this case 
21 could be ordered to run consecutively with any other holds 
22 that you are currently facing. Do you understand that? 
23 A. Yes, I do. 
24 Q. How far did you go in school, Mr. Legg? 
25 A. 11th grade. 
0 0 0 P< V; '" 
1 Q. Are you able to read and write and understand 
2 the English language? 
3 A. Yes, I am. 
4 Q. Are have you understood everything I have 
5 stated to you so far? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Mr. Legg, additionally, by pleading guilty to 
8 count 2 of the information, you should understand that you 
9 lose a number of very significant rights. First of all, 
10 yon lose your right to a trial and your right to a trial 
11 by a jury. You understand that? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. If you were to have a trial, Mr. Legg, you 
14 should also understand the law presumes you to be innocent 
15 of those charges. That presumption of innocence would, in 
16 fact, apply during the course of the trial. And at the 
17 trial, Mr. Legg, the State of Utah would be required to 
18 prove these charges filed against you beyond a reasonable 
19 doubt on each and every element of each charge before you 
20 could be convicted or found guilty of any of these charges 
21 that you are currently facing. And, in fact, if the State 
22 failed to meet that burden of proof, Mr. Legg, in all 
23 likelihood you would be entitled to be an acquittal or a 
24 dismissal of the charges. 
25 Furthermore, you should also understand that in 
1 order to be convicted by a jury, Mr. Legg, the jury's 
2 verdict would have to be a unanimous verdict. 
3 Additionally, you would have Mr. Brown's 
4 assistance at the trial and with his assistance, you would 
5 also have the right to question, confront and cross 
6 examine every witness called to testify against you. You 
7 would also have the right to subpoena into court your own 
8 witnesses, and an opportunity at a trial to present 
9 evidence on your own behalf and to also present witnesses 
10 or defenses on your own behalf as well. 
11 You should also understand, Mr. Legg, that at the 
12 trial no one could force you to take the witness stand, 
13 testify against yourself. You have the right to a speedy 
14 trial and if you were convicted after a trial, Mr. Legg, 
15 you would also have appeal rights. But for all intents 
16 and purposes, by accepting this plea agreement and 
17 pleading guilty to count 2, you will in fact lose each and 
18 every one of the rights that I just described to you, 
19 including your appeal rights. In fact, you substantially 
20 limit your right to an appeal by pleading guilty to count 
21 2. Do you understand all of that, Mr. Legg? 
22 A. Yeah. 
23 Q. You have any questions whatsoever about any 
24 of that? 
25 A* No. 
$m;:x§ 
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1 Q. Well, I noticed you hesitated. I thought 
2 possibly you had a question about any of those rights? 
3 A. No. It is just the situation I am in, that 
4 is all. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Brown, let me ask you, sir, in 
6 terms of count 2, is there a factual basis to support your 
7 client's guilty plea to that charge and if there is, what 
8 do you believe that factual basis to be. 
9 MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. I have written it 
10 in the guilty plea form. The defendant was a passenger in 
11 a vehicle that failed to stop after receiving a visual and 
12 audible signal to stop. After the car stopped, the 
13 defendant fled on foot. The elements that 1 have is the 
14 defendant, a party to the offense, an operator, who having 
15 received a visual or audible signal to stop, did attempt 
16 to flee or allude a peace officer by vehicle or other 
17 means. 
18 THE COURT: Did you understand that description 
19 of your conduct, Mr. Legg? 
20 A. Yes, I did. 
21 Q. Is that an accurate description of your 
22 conduct? 
23 A. That is why I am taking a plea. 
24 Q. Did you engage in that conduct intentionally 
25 and knowingly? 
7 
1 A. Yes, I did. 
2 Q. Do you understand that by pleading guilty to 
3 count 2, your guilty plea will be an admission of those 
4 elements? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And do you also understand that while there 
7 are alternative elements to count 2, those elements that 
8 you are pleading guilty to are, in essence, the same 
9 elements that the State would have to prove beyond a 
10 reasonable doubt in order to convict you of count 2. You 
11 understand that as well? 
12 A. No, not clearly. 
13 Q. Well, let me explain it this way. There are 
14 various ways in which count 2 can be committed. Mr. Brown 
15 has just described one way in which it can be committed 
16 and you recognized and acknowledged that conduct. And all 
17 I am trying to get you to understand is that if you were 
18 to have a trial on this particular case as to count 2, 
19 those elements that were just described by Mr. Brown and 
20 myself are the same elements that the state would have to 
21 prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict you at 
22 a trial. You understand that? 
23 A. Right. 
24 Q. Do you understand that? 
25 A. Yeah, I do. 
$'!rtV;!V 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Spikes, is there anything 
2 else you want to add by way of a factual basis as to count 
3 2, sir? 
4 MR. SPIKES: Your Honor, I don't believe so. We 
5 don't necessarily agree that that is what occurred but we 
6 are comfortable with the admission to those facts and that 
7 is an adequate basis to support the plea of guilty for 
8 that third degree felony. We are comfortable with that 
9 resolution. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Spikes. Mr. Brown, 
11 have you had an opportunity to prepare a written statement 
12 of the defendant in anticipation of his guilty plea to 
13 count 2; is that correct? 
14 MR. BROWN: I have, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: And you reviewed the full contents of 
16 that document with Mr. Legg? 
17 MR. BROWN: I have read it over with Mr. Legg. 
18 THE COURT: Did it appear to you that he 
19 understood the full contents of that document? 
20 MR. BROWN: I believe he did. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Legg, is it correct you had an 
22 opportunity to review the full contents of the written 
23 statement of the defendant with Mr. Brown? 
24 A. In full, yes. 
25 Q. And do you understand the full contents of 
fl ft ft " ":* '-
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1 that document? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Do you have any questions regarding anything 
4 contained in the document for either myself or Mr. Brown 
5 that you would like to question about at this point? 
6 A. No, it is pretty defined as it is stated in 
7 there. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Legg, can you tell me in your own 
9 words, Mr. Legg, why you think this is an appropriate way 
10 to resolve this case? 
11 A. At this given time, I was a passenger in the 
12 car. I am on probation now. I would be found guilty of 
13 probation violation for being out at that time of night 
14 and — 
15 Q. Let me ask you this question, Mr. Legg. Is 
16 part of the reason you are accepting this plea agreement 
17 is because you are receiving the benefit of the dismissal 
18 of the other counts? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. That has nothing to do with it? 
21 A. No. It is because of how I participated in 
22 the crime from which I stated from the very beginning, you 
23 know. I have a baby due in two weeks. I just want to 
24 get — You know, I am guilty of these crimes. I want to 
25 get on with life. 
'0 ft C 0 \f y 
1 Q. Are you prepared to sign the written 
2 statement at this time, sir? 
3 A. Yes, I am. 
4 Q. You may do so (Pause). The record may 
5 reflect Mr. Legg is signing the written statement of the 
6 defendant in open court at this time. 
7 Mr. Legg, are you satisfied with the services of 
8 your lawyer? 
9 A. Yes, I am. 
10 Q. You also understand the Rules of Procedure 
11 give you 30 days from today to file a motion asking for 
12 permission to withdraw your guilty plea? 
13 A. Yes, that was explained. 
14 Q. You should understand that even though the 
15 rules give you that opportunityt that doesn't mean that 
16 that would occur automatically. In fact, it does not 
17 occur automatically. You do understand that as well? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Mr. Spikes, is there anything you would like 
20 to add, sir? 
21 MR. SPIKES: Nothing further, Your Honor. 'We 
22 would ask for a Presentence Report. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Legg, formally for the record, 
24 how do you now plead to count 2 of the information, the 
25 charge of failure to respond to an officer's signal to 
0 0 0 0 9 ? 
1 stop, a third degree felony? 
2 A. Guilty as charged. 
3 THE COURT: The record should reflect that based 
4 upon Mr. Legg's verbal response to the questions put to 
5 him this morning, also based upon his knowledge and 
6 understanding of the contents of the written statement of 
7 the defendant and his signature thereto, the court is 
8 satisfied that Mr. Legg's guilty plea to count 2 is 
9 freely, voluntarily and knowingly entered and that plea 
10 will be received and entered at this time. 
11 Mr. Legg, has the right to be sentenced in not 
12 less than two nor more than 45 days from today. What I 
13 would like to do is refer him to Adult Probation and 
14 Parole for the purpose of a Presentence Report and 
15 schedule a sentencing date for him on this case for — 
16 MR. BROWN: Your Honor, as I indicated, there is 
17 a Presentence Report that has recently been done. So I 
18 believe it could be done in a fairly ~ 
19 THE COURT: When you say "recently," how old is 
20 that one? 
21 MR. BROWN: —expedited way. Three months or 
22 less. 
23 MR. LEGG: Late August or early September. 
24 THE COURT: It has been my experience that even 
25 with those updates, as I have explained to Mr. Brown now 
'Olrft?. 
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1 in chambers with AP&P, it has been my experience they 
2 still request at least 30 days. I can't see why they 
3 would need 45 days certainly. 
4 Let's schedule sentencing for Monday, January 
5 29th, today is the 28. That gives them that period of 
6 time. It is highly unlikely that I am going to receive a 
7 Presentence Report prior to that. 
8 It has been my experience that it is difficult to 
9 get them within the 30 days, let along to try to get them 
10 prior to that time. So we will set sentencing for the 
11 29th of January and that will be at 8:30 in the morning. 
12 MR. BROWN: Your Honor, the defendant having pled 
13 to one-third degree, I would ask the court to consider an 
14 appropriate bail in this particular case. The bail is set 
15 at $50,000. I would ask the court to set it in the area 
16 of 5, between 5 and 10, with the stipulation that he was 
17 able to bail out and that he would also be supervised by 
18 Pretrial Services. I don't think he is a flight to run. 
19 He indicates he has got a child that is coming. 
20 He has got ties here. The people who have been in court 
21 this morning have ties with him. He has lived in Salt 
22 Lake all of his life. Although he does have some prior 
23 criminal record, I don't think any of it indicates that he 
24 has ever not appeared for any type of hearing. It has 
25 been my belief if he were out on bail that he would show 
o u * n 
1 up for his sentencing. I am not sure he can even bail 
2 out, but I think that he should have at least an 
3 opportunity to try to bail out with an appropriate bail in 
4 this case. And if he did, to be supervised also by 
5 PretriE*. Services. 
6 THE COURT: As you are aware, and Mr. Spikes may 
7 not be aware, I don't know, we had a prior bond hearing in 
8 this particular case. I am not so sure that anything has 
9 changed as a result of Mr. Legg entering his guilty plea 
10 here today from the ruling I entered at that bond 
11 reduction hearing, other than the fact that I didn't make 
12 this clear on the record consistent with the plea 
13 agreement, counts 1 and 3 should be dismissed at this 
14 time. Mr. Spikes, what would you like to say on the 
15 State's behalf, sir? 
16 MR. SPIKES: I think our concern, and again I 
17 don't have the full information, Your Honor. I believe 
18 Mr. Blaylock covered that hearing. He clearly is 
19 currently on probation. 
20 THE COURT: Is that probation for a felony 
21 offense? 
22 MR. SPIKES: I believe it is for a number of 
23 misdemeanors out of Judge Palmer's court. 
24 MR. BROWN: I think it is a class B misdemeanor 
25 before Judge Palmer. 
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1 MR. LEGG: Class A. 
a MR. BROWN: Class A to class B. 
3 MR. LEGG: There has been nothing from AP&P to 
4 violate my probation at this time. 
5 THE COURT: You know, Mr. Brown, I am inclined to 
6 keep Mr. Legg's status as it is. I am not persuaded that 
7 dismissal of counts 1 and 3 substantially change my view 
8 of this case based upon my earlier ruling in this case. 
9 Additionally, and I know I don't need to cite the 
10 statute to you, Mr. Brown where once he has entered a 
11 guilty plea, then of course the responsibility becomes Mr. 
12 Legg's to make the appropriate showing under this statute. 
13 I am just not persuaded that that is accomplished here. 
14 MR. BROWN: I just think his ties to the 
15 community are such that he would appear for his hearing, 
16 even in the worse scenario. 
17 THE COURT: Let me interrupt you, Mr. Brown. 
18 This is a situation where pretrial has not looked at Mr. 
19 Legg because of the level of bail set? 
20 MR. BROWN: The level of bail is one of their 
21 considerations and the fact that he is on probation is 
22 probably their big concern even though it is a misdemeanor 
23 probation. 
24 MR. BROWN: Did you want to say anything further, 
25 Mr. Legg? 
06fl*<v 
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1 MR. LEGG: Yeah, there was one thing. Upon me 
2 being booked in the Salt Lake County Jail, I was never 
3 even screened for Pretrial or anything like that because 
4 of medical conditions. I was in the hospital and they 
5 moved me from the hospital to the medical ward and I was 
6 never even screened. So I don't know if that has anything 
7 to do with it. 
8 THE COURT: Let's do this, Mr. Brown. While I am 
9 going to order that bail remain as previously set, what I 
10 will do and I will ask that you take care of this, 
11 Mr. Brown, I will order that Pretrial Services at least 
12 interview Mr. Legg and let me receive their opinion as to 
13 whether or not they are willing to supervision him or not. 
14 Also in the meantime, Mr. Spikes, I would ask that 
15 Mr. Blaylock supply some input to this court and Mr. Brown 
16 as to what his position is now that we have reached this 
17 far in the case. 
18 MR. BROWN: Could I have a minute entry saying 
19 that the court ordered that Pretrial to take a look at 
20 him, otherwise they won't pay much attention to me. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. Susan will get that for you. 
22 Anything else? 
23 MR. BROWN: Okay. No. 
24 MR. SPIKES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: We will recess. 
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STATE OF UTAH
 SA1TIi r JT¥ 
tr 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
<P a* k •x?f. 
Defendant. 
c:&* 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER 
Case No . fs/fomr* 
COMES NOW. ^L^ L^z , the defendant in this case 
and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the following crime(s): 
CRIME & STATUTORY PROVISION DEGREE 
cjifcom Sift*** -fo shp 
PUNISHMENT 
&h jr&-f~ fcrf ^ M ft 
B. M« ^y^ttJ^ 
p-ti<fK*~ >f- ay^e £&^ 
C. fr» Dbk~-<*</ 
I have received a copy of the. (chargeLPnformation) against me, I have read it, 
and I understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading 
(guiltyHiio contest). 
wwa* 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, 
that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows: 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and 
understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I 
recognize that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, 
as determined by the court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me. 
2. I (have hotWhave) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right 
to counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following 
reasons: 
001)030 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and 
understand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other 
proceedings and the consequences of my plea of guilty, 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
A W A #7flyay > and I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement, 
my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that i have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense 
to testify in court upon by behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to 
do so I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse 
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not 
guilty" and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the 
burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial 
is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted 
by a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal by conviction and 
sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court 
and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be 
3 
k 
0 00 031 
paid by the state. 
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to 
which I pleacfTguHt^ (no contest). I know that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) to an 
offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself 
to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the 
sentences may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know 
that in addition to a fine a httfeHty-fivg-percent IgSsm) surcharge, required by Utah 
Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by 
the court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for 
additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am 
on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in 
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleadinggguijtyj)(no contest) I am waiving 
my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also 
know that by entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have 
committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) 
is/are entered. 
13. My pleats) of^gujjty? (no contest) (is) (is not) the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions 
of this plea bargain, is any, are gully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this 
4 
Q 0 S 0 3 ? 
affidavit. 
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of (guilty) 
(no contest) I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my 
plea. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession of recommendation of 
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing 
made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding 
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the court may do are also not binding on the court. 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to 
induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained herein and in the 
attached plea agreement, have been made to me. 
17. I have read this statement or I have had i read to me by my attorney, and 
I understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything 
contained in this statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
19. I am %H years of age; I have attended school through theCr^ f) grade 
and I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants 
which would impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). 
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which 
5 
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impair my judgment. 
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any 
mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this 2<f day of AKL-^L-, 19 ?£^ 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for-f f ihA^ J^spn , the 
defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read 
it to him/her and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully 
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. 
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct 
are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations and declarations 
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
/ATTORNEY FO~R DEFENDANT/BAR # 
6 
0 0 0*034 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
rffifalA. r^?**) • defendant. I have reviewed this statement of 
the defendant and find that the declarations, including the elements of the offense of 
the charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats or 
coercion to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are 
fully contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as 
supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable cause to believe that 
the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which 
the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public 
interest. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR # 
00005? 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification 
of the defendant and counsel, the court witnesses the signatures and finds the 
defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so 
ordered that the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set forth in 
the statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this ffi day of l f e < ~ ^ , 19J£T 
ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
8 
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ADDENDUM D 
RUT, **T5WT ftieSST 
Third J Ju.cjal District 
BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX # 6 2 0 7 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MONTREUX FRERES, P . C 
310 SOUTH MAIN, TWELFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE (801) 322-3021 
FAX NUMBER (801) 359-7406 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
FEB i 2 1996 
SAtfLAAECG'* ~ 
1 puiyCleck 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
JOHN KYLE LEGG, Jfc., 
DEFENDANT. 
RULE 63(B) MOTIOH 
TO DISQUALIFY THE COURT 
FROM FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
CASE NO. 951901968 FS 
JUDGE T. E. MEDLEY 
The Defendant in this matter, John Kyle Legg, Jr., by and 
through his attorney of record, Bel-Ami de Montreux, and pursuant 
to Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves 
for the disqualification of the Court from further proceedings in 
this matter. The grounds for this Motion are explained in 
Counsel's affidavit in support of this motion filed herewith. 
DATED this 11th day of February, 1996. 
R E R E S , P.C. 
'Montreux 
Attorney for Plaintiff! 
OOOOflf 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on February 12, 1996, I hand-delivered 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to the following: 
Roger S. Blaylock, Esq. 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915 
000062 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 1 2 1996 
fcLfLAXE COUNTY 
J£vC 
puiy Qter* 
BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX # 6 2 0 7 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MONTREUX FRERES, P . C . 
310 SOUTH MAIN, TWELFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 ) 3 2 2 - 3 0 2 1 
FAX NUMBER (801) 359-7406 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF , 
vs. 
JOHN KYLE LEGG, J&. , 
DEFENDANT. 
AFFIDAVIT IH SUPPORT OF 
RULE 6 3 ( B ) MOTIOH 
TO DISQUALIFY THE COURT 
FROM FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
CASE No. 951901968 FS 
JUDGE T. E . MEDLEY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
:ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
I, Bel-Ami de Montreux, Attorney at Law, and counsel to the 
Defendant in this matter, Mr. John Kyle Legg, having been sworn 
upon my oath, depose and state: 
1. The Defendant is an indigent who was previously 
represented by Mr. Lynn Brown of the Utah Legal Defenders 
Association. 
0OM p ? 
2. I was recently retained to represent the Defendant after 
his former attorney moved the Court to withdraw as counsel for the 
defendant, alleging conflict of interests. 
3. The Defendant's motion to withdraw the plea of guilty 
the Defendant previously entered in this matter is currently 
pending before the Court. Mr. Lynn Brown had filed the Motion, 
and most recently, I submitted the Defendant's affidavit and the 
affidavit of Mr. Lynn Brown in support of the motion to withdraw 
his plea. 
4. Since my appearance in this matter, I have had an 
opportunity to review the file and the affidavits submitted in 
support of the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. I have 
also interviewed the Defendant and other people with relevant 
information in this matter. 
5. The basis for the motion to disqualify the Court is 
that, on the day the Defendant was here to accept the plea 
agreement Mr. Lynn Brown negotiated on his behalf, a subpoenaed 
witness, Ms. Bonnie Villalobos, overhead a conversation between 
Court's personnel and the Prosecutor. Allegedly, Court's 
personnel said that Mr. Legg was not fit to be free and that he 
should be locked up for a long time. Allegedly, Mr. Lynn Brown 
joined in the conversation. 
6. Last Monday, on my first appearance on behalf of the 
Plaintiff, the Court exhaustively explained the occurrences 
between its personnel, the Prosecutor, and the extent to which the 
Court believed that Mr. Lynn Brown did not act improperly. 
00006 4 
7. Obviously, the Court is aware of the allegedly improper 
and inferably detrimental conversation between its personnel and 
the Prosecutor. That knowledge allows the fair inference and 
mitigates the Defendant's belief that the Court is biased and/or 
prejudiced against him and that the case against him cannot 
continue in this Court. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant RESPECTFULLY requests that the Court 
disqualifies itself from further proceedings in this criminal 
case. 
DATED this 11th day of February, 1996. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /jL day of 
February, 1996. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
PEGGY LHERRIW 
2<XE.Su7¥TwC*Or.$arriy(UT 
Uy Commotion Expifw JuJy 20, 
S T A T E O F U T A H 
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ADDENDUM E 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
"U"!!, 
J O H N K ill .E I! R I EGG 
D e 1: si i :l.£ 
(Jail) 
f IIIfTTTE ENTRY NOTICE 
D. I •  FEBRUARY 12
 f 19 y 6 
Case No: 951901968 FS 
.Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
CI ex k: STH 
Reporter: LiOROTHY 1 M1PP 
HEARING 
This case xs before the court for MOTION HEARING on the charges 
(2) I, . 1 1 , "II L"" S T ' J P j i Hh 1-" I ' , MMAND '"M1 POL! 1,11 (Third Degree Felony) 
Appearing for the State is ROGER BLAYLu,1 defendrin* li; 
lii I .."jiuiiiL , Appearing as counsel for the defendant i& BEL AM J 
DrMONTREUK. 
Based ' p i uf t.»nni&^  1 for the defendant icurf nrders 
defendant's mot .,,,, » withdraw ' 'l , 'i Midrav . " 
respond, to defendant's Rule 63(B) •" ' '• " , "ebruax m1 i I 
refer Defendant's Rule 63(11] Motion to Judge Lewis foi ' 
consideration and sentencing or disposition is continued to February 
2 6 at in Imii 
*)«(!{?§£ 
Case Number: 951901968 FS 
The court schedules the following on the date indicated: 
EVENT: SENTENCING ADDRESS: METRO. HALL OF JUSTICE 
DATE : FEBRUARY 26, 1996 240 EAST 400 SOUTH 
TIME : 8:29 AM SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
PLACE: ROOM 403 Judge : TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of 
the County Sheriff. 
O'ooce? 
Third JuoiciaJ District 
FEB 2 3 1996 
8/2£ 
i&puly Oteffc 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J 0 H M K Y L E L E Q ( } J R^ 
Defendant. 
1 III IIIIIIIIIF'ill^ Ill II111!!! B i t ' 1 INI Y 
I CASE NO. 951901968 
: 
x 
ii 
The defendant in the above ent-
to Disqualify Judge in accordance vith rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules 
iJf Civil Procedure. This Court questions the sufficiency of the 
affidavit therefore the matter Is referred to the Presiding Judge 
I PSI it i J.ew'is for determination. 
Il il ii L L e r: l i 11 m i ' e n t 1 y s i : h e i ,i 11 ill in III III " 111 e n c, 1 mi m i III i F P 1" i 11 « in y 
26, iy""36. 
Dated t h i s SL2> day o f Februajry% 1996 . rua^ y*, 
JNE E. MEDLEY 
[CT COURT JUDGE 
0 r, fl< 7 C 
STATE VS LEGG PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry to the following, this JX& day of 
February, 1996: 
Roger S. Blaylock 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bel-Ami De Montreux 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main, Twelfth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
0 
000071 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN KYLE LE6G JR., 
Defendant. 
: ORDER 
: CASE NO. 951901968 
: 
: 
t 
"Till is matter was referred to the presiding judge In accordance 
«PI. in I I n I I H i l i , « i i i I ( i l l in |i il  I in i n I i l l il «<" i mi il  p"1, mi C i 1 in i Procedure by the 
ass igned judge a f t e r the. Kill t tound Lite a t t i d a . i l I lun i I 
prejudice insufficient. 
Upon in ndependpnl revii u I Hi pi i s i d i n g 1111 I in I inds t he 
a f f i dav i l I | i II II > I I I I I ill II i 11 i i i i T h e 1 1 i e i e i e i m i i 
conve r sa t ion I li ill i I 1 i Ill IIIII i 1  between a court, c l e r k and a 
11 i i i ! .i i i hi i i I i l mi ppresentat dt the is^iqned 
judge overheard t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n . k'uiUii I I is no all lh m ill i IIIII 
illl ( the judge i s b i a sed in f a c t aga ins t il 11 I  *". det eiiiiilanL for any 
- mere f a c t t h a t a c o n v e r s a t i o n may have occur red Jbetwt'eii 
f
 personnel and ii prosecutor , does - ind ica te a Court i s 
mi mi Il M p I "• f r r e c u s a l . 
i\ i) ra",:; i 
STATE V. LEGG PAGE TWO ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, this case is referred back to the 
assigned judge. /"/ *^--- >^ s' / 
Dated t h i s 
/ 
,
 w „ . y\ 
Sttt "¥. LEGES' 
PRESIDING JUDGE 
0 0 007? -
STATE V. LEGG PAGE THREE ORDER 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I herehy certify that T mailed i true arni correct copy of the 
f*l\ 
f o r e g o i n g u i d u i , I i I I in l u l l I N I I I | I  In i s / "' . d a ' j I  Mill .III I i n 
R o g e r S • B l a y loci: k 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 
Salt.,, Lake City# Utah 84111 
Bel-Ami de Montreux 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 S. Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake <"' ** «* 
Honorable Tyrone r y 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lave City, m-a 
K. -IYIMMMUTW 
u '< r , ; p 
ADDENDUM F 
WED 0 9 : 0 9 LDA NO. S C 5320330 
LYNN R. BROWN, #0460 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC 
424 East 5 0 0 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN KYLE LEGG, JR., 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. 95190I968FS 
J U D G F T Y R O N E E MFDL.EY 
T h e unders igned , L Y N N R. B R O W N , duly d e p o s e s and says: 
' • - . ? - - - l o h n Kvle Les? 
2 . T h a t o n D e c e m b e r 2 V, I »' t't, ilic ilHi'inliini fi IM'I «d d yuiliy \J\*A m < min i 
II, I illi'ii• in ki'siiiiiiil in in i >r f i r a r / s Sipnal ro Stop, 1 J u r d degree felony, a n d s e n t e n c i n g 
was set for February 5, 1996. 
3 . T h a t the plea L M I g a i n i n g r.onslsted nl ll"' rfkmf«.ii nf rnunr |f Receiving or 
Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle, A Second Degree Felony; and Count III, Criminal 
Mischief, a Third Degree Felony. It was also agreed that ti 
n i in i in in ihiriHir rrpntment program placement for Mr. Legg if a program would 
accept him. 
O G 0 0 5 * 
wi/r 
FAX NO. 2.' 320330 P. 03 
4. That at the rime of the guilty plea, I was informed by the prosecution that 
one of the Defendant's friends, Bonnie Villafobos, a supoenaed witness, was present and 
overheard a conversation between the prosecution and court personnel about allegations 
of the defendant's misconduct in court on a prior case. 
5. That I was also informed by Ms. Villalobos that she overheard said 
conversations and she considered them offensive and prejudicial to the defendant. 
6. That the defendant became aware of this incident from conversations with 
Ms. Vlllalobos and informed me that he wanted to withdraw his plea because of his belief 
that his attorney, the judge and the prosecution were privy to the informal conversation 
and the plea bargain was not made in good faith. 
DATED this f day of February, 1996. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED; 
# & 
LYNN R, BROWN 
Attorney at Law 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
) 
) 
t ( day of 1 On the L d*y c f February, 1996 , personalty appeared before me, Lynn R. Brown, the signer of the 
foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me diat he executed the same. 
NOTASY PUBUC 
Dtart~ 2. Grambow 
424 S . - : 500 Sou*#300 
Salt t ..::> City, Utah 04111 
Kv Cdftrmttfon Exp*m 
Ajrni to, \Wf I 
STATE <dMgPAfl J 
My Commission Expires: { 1 J m 
NOTARY 
Residing im 
J^JQJAJL&XJ 
<;££ 
00005? 
ADDENDT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH Transcript of: 
Plaint i f f , 
v s . 
SENTEHfclDlDISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
sb>. SEPJ 61996 
JOHN KYLE LEGG, JR. By. 
"' tSefStny^lerfc 
Defendant. Case No. 951901968 FS 
The above-entitled cause of action came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, 
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the 
State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, on Monday, 
February 26, 1996. 
Appearances 
For the Plaintiff: HOWARD LEMCKE 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
For the Defendant: 
FHED^?«§ST£fsJ$&T 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 1 6 1996 
S/'-tTLAXECOUK 
Dy£w Cterfc 
BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX 
Attorney at Law 
310 South Main #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
FILED 
DC: b - '£96 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court
 n M A 00 0 * 4 
%dp0^cA 
1 
1 Monday, February 26, 1996 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: This is the No. 3 case on the 
4 calendar, case No. 951901968, State of Utah vs. Legg. The 
5 record should reflect Mr. De Montreux and Mr. Legg and 
6 Mr. Elizondro (Mr. Lemcke), that I referred this matter, 
7 based upon the defendant's filing of a Rule 63 Affidavit 
8 of Prejudice. Consistent with that rule, I questioned the 
9 sufficiency of the affidavit and referred the matter to 
10 Judge Lewis for review. Judge Lewis reviewed that matter 
11 on Friday and gave the case back to me, finding the 
12 allegations and affidavit insufficient. 
13 Additionally, last Friday and I think most of 
14 last week, Judge Lewis has been involved apparently in a 
15 jury trial. As a result of that, she was unable to reduce 
16 her ruling to a written order. Gave me permission to 
17 place this matter on the record here today and she did 
18 indicate that either today or tomorrow that she would 
19 place the written order in the file. 
20 With that issue resolved, I need to ask you, Mr. 
21 De Montreux, if you know of any legal reason why Mr. Legg 
22 should not be sentenced at this time? 
23 MR. DE MONTREUX: No, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: You have had an opportunity to review 
25 the Presentence Report; is that correct? 
0 0 ft t i v 
2 
1 MR. DE MONTREUX: I did, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: And what is it you would like to say 
3 on Mr. Legg!s behalf? 
4 MR. DE MONTREUX: Your Honor, this is a difficult 
5 case and I read the Presentence Report and I have to say 
6 that I am somewhat disappointed in the Presentence Report. 
7 The reason being, I see they gave the court a few pages, 
8 about five or six pages, trying to explain to the court 
9 why this man should go to prison. However, that 
10 Presentence Report for some unknown reason failed to look 
11 at this person as a real person. Failed to look at his 
12 background, what he has been through in his life. This 
13 man has suffered hell and that is what he has been through 
14 from his family's hands. 
15 It this man went to trial, the court would have 
16 heard of a man who was a victim of his own family, his own 
17 mother. That is why he is here today. Never had a 
18 chance. This man was set to fail and he has failed. Here 
19 is a Presentence Report that doesn't look at him as a 
20 person. Doesn't give him a chance, but says, "Send him to 
21 prison like a dog; that is where he belongs." 
22 Your Honor, this is not fair. This system should 
23 be helping people to rehabilitate themselves. Should give 
24 them an opportunity to come back and be members of society 
25 that we can trust. Why is it the only thing we want to do 
k)oi)'tr 
3 
1 is send them all to prison just because they make mistakes 
2 and when they are accused? 
3 This man was a victim of his own family his 
4 entire life. He has been beatened, abused. The 
5 Presentence Report doesn't care. Because he was involved 
6 in this situation, they want him to go to prison. He 
7 spent five years in prison before• It was a tough time. 
8 He spent half of it in there with prisoners without 
9 interest. That is his whole motive. Never had any. He 
10 never had you. He never had me. He never had good 
11 opportunities. He had a bad family* They never looked at 
12 him as a person. They only look at him as a bad person 
13 that should be caged for the rest of his life. 
14 After serving five years in prison, and get out 
15 in 1993. Since 1993, Your Honor, this man has not been 
16 before this court and that is because he has learned to 
17 accept some responsibility for his actions. Now he is 
18 back here unfortunately. 
19 Now why is it we do not send this guy somewhere 
20 to get the treatment he deserves? Why are we going to send 
21 bi^fc back to prison to coifce back & <«orse parson. That is 
22 puzzling to me. Our system should begin to help people 
23 rehabilitate themselves. Not only punish them, punish 
24 them, Your Honor. Give this man a chance. Go around the 
25 Presentence Report. Find a reason to give this man a 
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1 chance. Show to him that somebody, you, can trust him, 
2 Can give him a second chance or even if it is a third or 
3 fourth chance. Spare his life. 
4 John Legg can be a good member of society and I 
5 believe given the opportunity, he can do it. He has got 
6 two children to feed. He has got a kid born just the 
7 other day, a month ago while he is in jail that he hasn't 
8 had a chance to interact with. He would like to go out 
9 there, work and support his family. 
10 Your Honor again, let's look at this man as a 
11 person. His criminal record is bad. Your Honor, there 
12 are justifications for it. He has never, ever had an 
13 opportunity. Of course, he is old now and he has got to 
14 take responsibilities for his actions. He can do that. 
15 He showed that he could do it for a few years. He 
16 regrets. Many of us fail. But then again, Your Honor, if 
17 we never give that person again a chance, that person is 
18 going to come back a lot worse. Give this man a chance. 
19 There are two programs out there who are prepared 
20 to accept him. One is the Salvation Army and the other 
21 one is something called IRC. 
22 Your Honor, there are certain stringent 
23 conditions that you can impose on this guy. You can 
24 require that he serve a very stringent probation. We can 
25 take a lot of civil liberties away from him. The worst 
tj i t <•» ». 1 * 
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1 thing we can do this morning is to take this man, send him 
2 to the Utah State Prison, and then he is going to come 
3 back. This guy will serve the sentence. What kind of 
4 person will he be? He is going to come back here again. 
5 Your Honor, I am not going to go on. 
6 Your Honor, will you show this man that we can be 
7 fair even if he is not a fair person. To look at him, his 
8 entire life, and give him a chance. He is prepared to 
9 proceed with his life. Place this man on probation. He 
10 has already served about five months in the County Jail. 
11 Keep him in the County Jail for another 4 or 5 months. 
12 Please do not send this man to the Utah State Prison. 
13 This is not an appropriate university for him to graduate 
14 from again. That has failed before and that will fail 
15 again. Please. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. De Montreux. Who is 
17 representing the State on this matter? 
18 MR. LEMCKE: Howard Lemcke on the sentencing, 
19 Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Go ahead, sir. 
21 MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, although counsel makes 
22 an eloquent case for looking at this situation of the 
23 defendant, and looking at what we can do, what is 
24 perceived best for him. We have to come in here, Your 
25 Honor, and ask you to do what is best for the community. 
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1 As counsel mentioned, it is a horrible record, 
2 He has, in fact, been out to the prison* He is on notice 
3 that his conduct will be punished. He has had the benefit 
4 of this bargain here by taking the number of things that 
5 were charged, the number of things that could have been 
6 charged for the ramming of the police car, the fleeing, 
7 And he has had the benefit of this bargain.- At this point 
8 we have to ask you to safeguard the community, follow the 
9 recommendations of the presentence report an return him to 
10 the Utah State Prison. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lemcke. 
12 MR. DE MONTREUX: Your Honor, if I may quickly 
13 respond. Again, I would like to stress there comes a time 
14 in the system where they should have to rehabilitate 
15 themselves, not punish them. What the State is asking is 
16 nothing but punishment because this man has never had a 
17 chance. 
18 Again, I am asking the court to scan his entire 
19 life. Do not synthesize to this five pages or six pages 
20 in your hand. Please give this man unfortunately, reduce 
21 this to a year in prison, in the jail house over there. 
22 Let him finish that time, Your Honor. Let him go back to 
23 his family. Let him get the treatment that he deserves 
24 cause he was not given it. He never had it in prison 
25 before. Let us please in this case make an exception. 
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1 Get Mr. Legg, unfortunately, to believe in us because 
2 right now I believe that he can be a better person if 
3 given that opportunity. Let me say this, Your Honor. I 
4 leave this to your sound discretion. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Demontreux. I have 
6 had an opportunity to review the full contents of the 
7 Presentence Report. And let me say that I am going to 
8 follow the recommendation that is contained in the 
9 Presentence Report. The major problem that I have with 
10 Mr. Legg is his demonstrated prior conviction record, and 
11 the underlying facts in this particular case. I don't 
12 think I need to restate for the benefit of the record the 
13 defendant's prior conviction record. I have it before me. 
14 It is not really in dispute. 
15 At the time of the commission of this particular 
16 offense, Mr. Legg was also on probation. The Presentence 
17 Report tells me that the commitment that he did do at the 
18 prison, at least according to the Presentence Report, he 
19 was initially placed on probation. And then that 
20 probation was revoked. Again, I am reading the contents 
21 of the Presentence Report. (Defendant shaking head 
22 negatively) 
23 THE COURT: Based on some of Mr. Legg's own 
24 comments that are set forth in the Presentence Report, it 
25 is clear as well that Mr. Legg has a problem maintaining 
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1 control and maintaining his own on anger. I think even he 
2 would admit to that. 
3 This is a situation where it was a dangerous 
4 situation: the fleeing incident itself. And then 
5 apparently we have a driving pattern where the vehicle 
6 engages in some form of spin-out%and the ultimate result 
7 is, in essence, a head-on collision with the police 
8 vehicle, causing several thousands of dollars of damage. 
9 There is one thing you said, Mr. Demontreux, that 
10 I agree with one hundred percent. And to be honest with 
11 you, it is a little bit scary. And that is that if past 
12 performance and past history is any indication of future 
13 performance, there is a very good chance that once Mr. 
14 Legg gets through serving the commitment, and the time 
15 comes for his release, which it will be at 5 years or some 
16 period short of 5 years, there are strong indications that 
17 Mr. Legg may come out of that experience worse. Even if 
18 he came out of it the same, it still would be a major 
19 problem. But the problem, Mr. Demontreux, for me with Mr. 
20 Legg is that I can't just be all about one hundred percent 
21 rehab. I am not opposed to rehab. If I could waive the 
22 magic wane, I would rehab Mr. Legg right now. I can't do 
23 that. I believe in protecting the public first. And 
24 clearly Mr. Legg's performance on this particular case, 
25 and I mean the underlying facts in this case and his 
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1 performance, while on probation and his prior conviction 
2 record, clearly established someone who is just out of 
3 control and who continually violates the law. 
4 Consequently, those are the reasons, why I am 
5 going to follow the recommendation in the Presentence 
6 Report and sentence Mr. Legg to zero to 5 years at the 
7 Utah State Prison and I am going to order that commitment 
8 issue forthwith. This is a situation where Mr. Legg has 
9 demonstrated in his prior conviction record and the 
10 underlying facts in this particular case, that he is what 
11 I would call anyway a fairly serious threat to the 
12 community. 
13 Additionally, I think it is appropriate for this 
14 court to order full and complete restitution in this 
15 particular case for the damage caused to the police 
16 vehicle which was rammed in the amount of $7,005.34. I 
17 note that the officer, who is not seeking restitution, 
18 even though apparently he did maintain some minor injuries 
19 as a result of this collision and as a result apparently 
20 of the chemicals from the air bag that escaped as a result 
21 of this collision. 
22 I don't see any utility, quite frankly, in 
23 imposing any additional fines or surcharge assessments but 
24 clearly this decision is based upon Mr. Legg's prior 
25 record, his inability to complete probation successfully, 
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1 and the underlying facts in this particular case, clearly 
2 call out to protect the community at this point. Anything 
3 else counsel? 
4 MR. DE MONTREUX: Yes, Your Honor. My client has 
5 served, I believe, 6 months in the jail house. He would 
6 like the court to credit that against his sentence at the 
7 Utah State Prison. Or is that the normal thing that will 
8 happen? 
9 THE COURT: What I am about to say, 
10 Mr. Demontreux, I am limited by my own knowledge and 
11 understanding of the law and as of this day I suggest 
12 that the only thing I could do, first of all, would be to 
13 make a recommendation because the board is not obligated 
14 to credit the time served. That is my understanding. 
15 There are some competing issues regarding credit 
16 for time served in this particular case, and I may be 
17 mistaken on this but it seems to me that Mr. Legg has some 
18 other holds. I don't know if that is totally accurate. I 
19 did know he had a pending matter out of the State of 
20 Arizona, I believe, for which he is on probation. There 
21 is some problem in that regard. The bottom line is that 
22 the only thing I can do at this point is to make a 
23 recommendation. And the truth of the matter is, Mr. De 
24 Montreux and Mr. Legg, I don't like making that type of 
25 recommendation unless there is a reasonable, rational 
0 P ft 1 •> f: 
1 basis for me to make it. And in this particular case, I 
2 think Mr. Legg has demonstrated through the underlying 
3 facts of this case and his prior record, that he is of 
4 sufficient treat to the community that I could not make a 
5 good faith recommendation in his particular case. I 
6 certainly can't order it anyway. It would be non-
7 binding. 
8 MR. DE MONTREUX: Thank you, Your Honor. 
9 (Hearing adjourned) 
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